The conceptual foundations of Leonard Hawes’ approach to communication are critically examined. It is argued that Hawes’ implicit retention of behaviorism’s philosophical presuppositions led to Hawes’ misconstrual of Alfred Schutz’s interpretive theory of social science and to contradictions and conceptual confusions in Hawes’ theory. It is suggested that communication theorists must, if they are to avoid Hawes’ difficulties, be well acquainted with the philosophical issues that underlie social science.

It is becoming increasingly evident to social scientists that one’s underlying assumptions affect one’s theoretical and methodological formulations. Acknowledging this, several communication theorists have in recent years turned a critical eye on various presuppositions, with a view to providing firm conceptual foundations for subsequent work. Such concern is, as Kuhn has suggested, frequently associated with periods of theoretical upheaval and change. David Smith’s call for a “process” orientation is a clear example; Smith urges that communication theorists recognize the widespread commitment to “behavioristic methodology” and abandon such methods for others. Smith, of course, is not alone in his dissatisfaction with psychological behaviorism; it has been the subject of several increasingly trenchant criticisms. But those who urge a rejection of behaviorism do not typically recognize and critically analyze behaviorism’s underlying philosophical

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3 Kuhn, pp. 47-48, 88.

4 Smith, 182, 177.

assumptions: in particular, physicalism and the logical empiricist philosophy of science.

It is our contention that a disregard for behaviorism's philosophical groundwork can lead to difficulties in the construction of a satisfactory theory of communication. This is particularly true in the case of a viewpoint that attempts to move away from behaviorism, since if behaviorism's philosophical assumptions are carried over, the "new" viewpoint may well suffer from conceptual difficulties.⁶

We attempt to show this through a critical examination of Leonard Hawes' recent theoretical formulation.⁷ Hawes explicitly addresses certain questions regarding philosophical theories of human action in order to provide the foundations for the study of what is increasingly the central focus of communication theory, namely, interpersonal interaction.⁸ Hawes locates his view in the "conceptual overlap" between two philosophers, Alfred Schutz and May Brodbeck (p. 12).


⁷Leonard C. Hawes, "Elements of a Model for Communication Processes," QJS, 59 (1973), 11-21; further references to this article appear in the text. Hawes' views are also put forth in "Development and Application of An Interview Coding System," Central States Speech Journal, 33 (1972), 92-99, hereafter cited as "Development."

formulations in social science, especially those grounded in a fundamental philosophical disagreement over the nature of human behavior: whether human action is reducible to mere physical movement. One might construe all human behavior as nothing but physical movement. On this view, "all sentences of psychology describe physical occurrences." Contrary to this physicalistic viewpoint, one might argue for "a distinction between persons as physical organisms and persons as agents, as beings who can act and who have intentions, motives, reasons, desires, and so forth," as the so-called "New Dualists" have.

While it is probably true that no psychological behaviorist really hews to the strict physicalist position, physicalism is nevertheless a necessary ideal for behaviorists. Skinner, for example, makes it quite clear that he seeks a "physical analysis," that is, explanations phrased in "the language of physical science," descriptions in physicalistic terms; Hull stresses that the basic principles of psychology are to be based on "colorless movement and mere receptor impulses as such;" and both Watson and Osgood stress the primacy of neuro-physiological and physio-chemical explanations. This physicalistic commitment is often obscured by the use of the term "behavior," which elides action- and movement-considerations. As Charles Taylor has pointed out:

The confusion of action with movement can often be used to lend credence to behaviorism. It is true that we learn about people through their behavior. This becomes even more true if we include speech in "behavior." But it does not follow that we learn about them through their movements or through their autonomic reactions, or through the chemical processes which their bodies undergo. For the behavior which we mainly learn from is action, and it is only qua action that it is revelatory, just as speech tells us little or nothing as a stream of sound, but much as meaningful language.

One must be careful to recognize that physicalism does not entail "mechanism;" contemporary theories in physics are a case in point. Thus the currently popular rejection of "mechanism" in social scientific theorizing does not necessarily include a rejection of physicalism.

Obviously, however, a mere statement of the dualism offered by the New Dualists is not satisfactory; what is needed is an elaboration of just what the difference is between action and movement. This is what Wittgenstein called for when he asked, "What is left

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9 As we shall use the word, "behavior" is a generic term encompassing both action and movement. One must exercise caution in translating between our usage and that of other writers; for many writers, the term "behavior" is closer to our sense of movement. We use the term as we do to fill the need for a term whose sense indicates the way in which both action and movement can be seen as belonging to a common class.
12 For discussion of this point, see Hans Skjorheim, _Objectivism and the Study of Man_ (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1959), p. 60.
17 These theories are physicalistic (in the sense of involving only physical variables, etc.) but not mechanistic (since relativistic quantum mechanics has long replaced Newtonian mechanism). We are aware of the instrumentalistic interpretation that is typically given to contemporary physical theory. Our use of the term "physicalistic" to characterize that theory should not be construed as implying a realist interpretation of, e.g., quantum theory (in other words, we are here using "physicalistic" in a way that transcends the instrumentalism-realism controversy; this usage is, we think, quite consistent with the typical usage in action theory).
over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up [movement] from the fact that I raise my arm [action].”

Without intending to give a thorough treatment of the wide variety of answers offered in the action-movement literature, nor to derive an ultimately satisfactory resolution of the issue, let us begin at a plausible point of departure: that that which distinguishes action from movement is the former’s intentionality or purposefulness. Now even those who agree to this general way of drawing the distinction differ over just how to characterize “intention” and “purpose.” Our focus of attention for the remainder of this section is on one particular approach, which holds something like the following. Action and movement are differentiated by intention and purpose, but intention and purpose are themselves reducible to (completely characterizable by) purely physicalistic terms; and thus actions are particular sorts of movements—but movements nonetheless. Thus this position, while on the surface accepting a New Dualist slant (i.e., differentiating action and movement), ultimately rejects the New Dualists thesis (since the position in question argues that persons can be satisfactorily construed as nothing but physical organisms). This is apparently May Brodbeck’s view. On the one hand she states that “the difference between the action of raising my arm and the movement of my arm going up is that the former is done intentionally or for a purpose.” At the same time she argues that “an objectivist definition of ‘purpose,’ corresponding to the mental state, can be constructed.” Brodbeck’s explication of this objectivist definition of purpose has two stages. First, she broadens the use of the term “physical” to include not only “muscle-twitches, glandular secretions, shape and size” but also “pattern[s] of overt behavior.” Second, she claims that it is these “patterns” which distinguish action: “Generally, a pattern of behavior observed in the past or to be observed in the future towards things and other people is the ‘something more’ than present or manifest characters that is meant [referred to] by defined terms referring to actions.” Brodbeck thus denies the New Dualists’ distinction between persons as agents and persons as physical organisms: “The relevant differences [between action and movement] can be objectively construed without appealing to any vitiating participant ‘inside knowledge.’ In this respect, there is nothing about such . . . differences . . . marking them as ‘logically’ different from those of natural science.”

II

Opposed to Brodbeck’s view are authors such as Alfred Schutz. Three

19 Although a complete discussion would require an elucidation of the relation of intention and purpose, we will here treat them as synonymous.
20 A brief and introductory survey of some of the positions can be found in Jerome A. Shaffer, Philosophy of Mind (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 80-97.
21 May Brodbeck, “Meaning and Action,” Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sci-
preliminary points are in order. First, Schutz's conception of human action must be carefully distinguished from his epistemological prescriptions for the study thereof. Second, we shall discuss Schutz's approach to the human sciences avoiding as much as possible a discussion of his phenomenology; in so doing we necessarily present an incomplete picture of his views. Third, Schutz's use of the terms "objective" and "subjective" requires some explication. For an observer, the action of some other person is an object, and thus the observer's perspective on that action is an "objective perspective" (or, as Schutz calls it, an "objective meaning-context"). The actor's perspective, however, is necessarily a subjective one, in the sense that the actor is the subject of the action.27

In Schutz's conception of human action, action is distinguished from behavior on the basis of the former's meaningfulness,28 which is characterized as follows: "... what distinguishes action from behavior is that action is the execution of a projected act. ... The meaning of an action is its corresponding projected act."29 Action is thus intrinsically subjective:


27 Our separation of Schutz's action theory and his approach to the human sciences from other aspects of his philosophy is justifiable in his own view (PSW, pp. 43-4). Except where noted, we employ Schutz's usage of the terms "objective" and "subjective" (see PSW, p. 37, 134) throughout.

28 Schutz's use of the term "behavior" generally corresponds to what we will otherwise call "movement." We will in this section follow Schutz's usage so as to avoid confusion regarding sections quoted from PSW. It should be realized that for Schutz both action and behavior are meaningful, but the character of the meaningfulness is different in the two (PSW, p. 19).

29 PSW, p. 61, italics in original. Brodbeck distinguishes four senses of "meaning" (referen-

The unity of the action is constituted by the fact that the act already exists "in project," which will be realized step by step through the action. ... The unity of the action is, then, subjective, and the problem of inserting the subjective meaning into a piece of behavior which supposedly already has objective unity turns out to be a pseudo-problem. It must now be clear that an action is meaningless as action apart from the project which defines it. ... A meaning is not really attached to an action. If we say it is, we would understand that statement as a metaphorical way of saying that we direct our attention upon our experience in such a way as to constitute out of them a unified action.30

In addressing the topic of the role of motivation in action, Schutz distinguishes two types of motives. The "in-order-to" motive represents the project of which the action is to be the fulfillment. The "because" motive represents those prior conditions which from the actor's view determined the character of the project.31 Both types of motive thus exist within the subjective meaning-context of the actor.32

In building a link between his analysis of human action and an understanding of the methodology appropriate to the human sciences, Schutz holds to Max
tial, signifying, intentional, and psychological), none of which includes Schutz's. The closest she comes is "psychological meaning," and this she construes as just the bodily states; see Brodbeck, p. 65.

30 PSW, pp. 62-3, italics in original.

31 Ibid., p. 22.

32 Alfred Schutz, "The Social World and the Theory of Social Action," Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences, ed. David Braybrooke (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 60. To avoid ambiguity concerning the relations between the two types of motives and the subjectivity and objectivity of meaning-contexts, the reader must recall our second preliminary observation concerning Schutz's work. From the perspective of Schutz's phenomenology, the because motives form an objective meaning-context, since the actor's reflection on his own because motives necessarily involves treating the act as an object (the in-order-to motive is intrinsically subjective, however); see Maurice Natanson, "Introduction," in CP I, p. xxxix. From the perspective of Schutz's conception of human action and the methodology of the social sciences, however, the relation is as expressed in the text.
Weber's postulate of subjective understanding. For both Weber and Schutz, the aim of the social sciences is to find some way of describing and understanding the purely subjective meaning of human action. The question at hand is whether the observer's meaning (the objective meaning-context) can perfectly coincide with the actor's meaning (the subjective meaning-context). Schutz clearly indicates they cannot: "the meaning I give to your experiences cannot be precisely the same as the meaning you give to them when you proceed to interpret them."*4

Recognizing this, Schutz proposes a rather complicated methodological stance which is based on his reformulation of Weber's concept of "ideal types." The details of Schutz's view can be safely bypassed here, however. The important point is this: Schutz stresses that the "primary task" of the social scientist is the description of the "processes of meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation as these are carried out by individuals living in the social world"—and that "if we are going to understand the concept of meaningful action . . . we must examine the formation and structure of those lived experiences which give meaning to an action." In short, the object of social scientific study is subjective meaning-contexts.*5

Alfred Schutz and May Brodbeck thus exemplify diametrically opposed views of the nature of human action. Schutz's approach places him squarely within the approach of the New Dualists. Brodbeck, on the other hand, is basically a physicalist, albeit a physicalist who distinguishes action and movement.*6

III

Hawes asserts that the foundations of his approach to communication lie in "the conceptual overlap between Schutz and Brodbeck" (p. 12). But if Brodbeck and Schutz hold such widely divergent views of human action, as we have argued above, then Hawes' alleged "conceptual overlap" would appear to be a chimera. Now it might be thought that Hawes has in some fashion achieved a synthesis of the views that Brodbeck and Schutz represent. But it is difficult to imagine what such an integration would be like. At the very least, Hawes has not presented such a synthesis, for we argue in this section that Hawes finds a compatibility between the two perspectives only by virtue of his inadequate understanding, and correlative misconstrual, of the point of view Schutz represents; such misinterpretation, of


*35 See PSW, 176-250 passim. A full discussion of Schutz's ideal-typical methodology would require inordinate space given the aims of this paper. While many interpretive sociologists (e.g., Paul F. Mer, Michael Phillipson, David Silverman, and David Walsh, New Directions in Sociological Theory [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973]) question the validity of the ideal-typical approach per se, Schutz's consistent emphasis on subjective meaning-contexts remains unquestioned by these writers.

*36 PSW, p. 248.

*37 Ibid., p. 41.

*38 Ibid., p. 224.

*39 Calling Schutz a New Dualist is somewhat misleading. The New Dualist camp grows out of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of mind; Schutz's views on the other hand stem from Husserlian phenomenology. But for the purposes of this paper, attempting to carefully outline the relation between Schutz and the New Dualists would unnecessarily complicate matters; it will suffice here to view Schutz as a New Dualist.

*40 While the above discussion has been by and large restricted to the question of distinguishing action and movement, an adequate conceptual foundation for any theory in the human sciences must in our view take account of the related issues concerning the explanation of human behavior (in the generic sense), and in particular the "reasons vs. causes" dispute. See Myles Brand, ed., The Nature of Human Action (Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman, 1970), and A. R. White, ed., The Philosophy of Action (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968).
course, obviates the possibility of a genuine synthesis.

This can be most clearly shown by considering three reasons for believing that Hawes’ foundations cannot be found in the views of Alfred Schutz. First, Hawes and Schutz differ over the nature and aims of science in general and social science in particular. The view of the scientific enterprise that predominates in the social sciences envisions the social scientist as seeking to explain, predict, and control human behavior. These aims are to be accomplished by developing a set of theoretical statements (a theory) which serves to explain a range of phenomena. The theory is to be tested (verified or falsified) by comparing the predictions of the theory to observations. To the extent that the observations (or better, the observation-statements) can be seen as following deductively from the theoretical premises, the theory thereby earns our confidence. This approach to the social sciences is rather clearly modeled on what is taken to be the methodology employed in the natural sciences. This general viewpoint finds its philosophical expression in the logical empiricist philosophy of science.41 Hawes’ adoption of this general perspective is evidenced in his concern with causal explanation (pp. 19-20)42 and in his statement that “the goals of the social sciences are to explain, predict, and control human behavior” (p. 19).

Schutz, on the other hand, is a prod-

uct of the Continental tradition which distinguishes social science from natural science. As Rickman puts it, “. . . the outstanding difference between the physical sciences and . . . all the human studies . . . [is] that the human world is permeated with meaning and that, in consequence, the relationships with which . . . [the social scientist] . . . is concerned are not merely causal relations—as is, crudely put, the case in the physical sciences—but meaningful relationships.”43 Schutz elaborates this as follows:

We cannot deal with phenomena in the social world as we do with phenomena belonging to the natural sphere. In the latter, we collect facts and regularities which are not understandable [already-meaningful] to us, but which we can refer only to certain fundamental assumptions about the world. . . . Social phenomena, on the contrary, we want to understand and we cannot understand them otherwise than . . . within the categories of human action. The social scientist must therefore ask . . . what happens in the mind of an individual actor whose act has led to the phenomenon in question.44

Thus Schutz’s view is that “every social science . . . sets as its primary goal the greatest possible clarification of what is thought about the social world by those living in it.”45 The interpretive approach which Schutz exemplifies rests on the assumption that the social world is meaningful for the participants who act in it. Thus the process of understanding

41 For the logical empiricist view, see, e.g., Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). An excellent discussion of the development of this view (and of the criticisms which have led to its rejection) can be found in Frederick Suppe, “The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories,” The Structure of Scientific Theories, ed. Frederick Suppe (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1974), pp. 3-241.

42 It is of little relevance here whether “direct,” “indirect,” or “mutual” causality is involved.


44 CP II, p. 85.

45 PSW, p. 222.
human social action must be grounded, on this view, in an explication of this already-meaningful social reality. Persons act on the basis of the meanings they construct in the on-going process of everyday life. The task of the human scientist is to understand the actor's meanings for his world and his actions, and the processes by which these meanings are constructed and negotiated. In seeking to construct the actors' perspectives on the world, the investigator must always be on guard that his own everyday interpretations not be unwittingly substituted for those of the participants. The interpretive stance thus represents a radical reconceptualization of social science, with attendant restrictions on appropriate methodological techniques.

The second point of divergence between Hawes and Schutz is given in their differing views on the object of social investigation. For Hawes, "the relationship—not the individual symbol user—is the ultimate object of investigation" (p. 18). He argues that "the communication interact is the fundamental unit of analysis in the study of communication" (p. 13), where "communication interacts are conceived of as concatenous and progressive pairs of aneccedent and subsequent acts" (p. 14). While Schutz would agree that individuals interact, his central focus would not be a reified "relationship," but rather the perspectives of the individuals involved. As Schutz puts it, "the social scientist observes human interaction patterns or their results insofar as they are accessible to his observation and open to his interpretation. These interaction patterns, however, he has to interpret in terms of their subjective meaning structure lest he abandon any hope of grasping 'social reality.'" Thus in Schutz's view it would be a mistake to focus, as Hawes does, "on the interrelationships of behaviors over time, regardless of who manifests those behaviors."

Thirdly, Hawes and Schutz differ over the way in which the social scientist ought to approach his objects. Schutz emphasizes that the social scientist, when constructing his objective meaning-contexts, must always keep his primary goal in mind: that of discerning the subjective meaning-context of the actor. But Schutz makes it quite clear that the social scientist cannot blithely assume that his objective meaning-context faithfully represents the actor's perspective; the relation of the two is always problematic. Hawes, however, ignores the question of to what degree the two coincide: "Two strategies are available for determining the function of communication behavior. The investigator can infer the function of behavior based on his own intuition and existing evidence, or he can ground his inferences in immediate projective data. The latter strategy was chosen." This offhand way of treating what is for Schutz the major problem for any social science is further reflected in Hawes' recommendation of the methodologies employed by

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48 Hawes' "stimulation recall" technique (p. 21; "Development," 94) fails to heed this caveat. The technique is used as an aid in developing a set of categories into which communication behavior is to be coded. But the employment of the coding system involves the investigator's (not the participants') judgment of which category a given behavior represents.

47 It should be noted that the interpretive view thus denies that methodological approaches are theory-free. It is incumbent on the researcher to develop research techniques consistent with his theoretical stance, rather than assume that any method can be consistently employed with a given theory.


Stech\textsuperscript{52} and Bostrom,\textsuperscript{53} neither of which exhibit concern for the subjective perspectives of the participants.

The general tenor of these three points of difference is exemplified in Hawes' treatment of Schutz's "in-order-to" and "because" motives. Hawes' view apparently is that the in-order-to motive is that which exists immediately subsequent to the action and the because motive that which exists immediately antecedent. To illuminate the two motives, Hawes proposes his interact-coding-system methodology (in which the subsequent and antecedent acts are seemingly to be construed as the two sorts of motive).\textsuperscript{54} Hawes' method is designed to bring out the "patterns" of communication, and Hawes' view is that "when the process and patterns become clearly defined, so do the 'in-order-to' and 'because' purposes and causes ... " (p. 20); this is allegedly so because, in Hawes' view, it is the "patterns of communication which constitute the 'because' and 'in-order-to' motives of the form of human activity being studied" (p. 20).\textsuperscript{55}

This is a rather serious misinterpretation of Schutz's views. Schutz clearly regards the in-order-to motive as the projected act in the mind of the actor prior to the initiation of the action itself,\textsuperscript{56} not as an actually extant state of affairs. Thus the in-order-to motive can only be discussed in the future perfect tense ("I will have done") as an anticipated completion before the fact. The because motive, too, represents not an objective\textsuperscript{57} state of affairs as Hawes implies, but rather the actor's reflection upon those motivating lived experiences which existed prior to the constitution of the project (which project is itself now seen by the actor as "existing" in the past) and which in the actor's view influenced the character of the project (not the action itself).\textsuperscript{58}

In Schutz's view, then, both types of motive exist within the subjective meaning-context of the actor; as a result the social scientist's attempt to discern these motives must necessarily involve the construction of the actor's perspective. Schutz's statement that "it is not necessary even that I know the actor personally in order to have an approach to his motives"\textsuperscript{59} (cited by Hawes, p. 12) must not be taken as a denial of the centrality of subjective meaning-contexts, but only an affirmation of the possibility of understanding the actions of anonymous subjects.\textsuperscript{60}

Hawes' misconstrual of the two sorts of motive as overt extant states of affairs is clearly a reflection of the differences earlier sketched between Hawes' view and the approach exemplified by Schutz. Indeed, Hawes' whole approach here suggests that it is the views of May Brodbeck, not those of Alfred Schutz, which form Hawes' basic foundations. Hawes' attempt to construe Schutz's

\textsuperscript{54} "'Apparent'ly and 'seemingly' because Hawes is not clear about just how his methods will cause the motives to 'reveal themselves' (p. 12). We construe the relation between Hawes' methodology and his view of Schutz as we do since only attributing this perspective to Hawes enables us to understand various statements he makes about the in-order-to and because motives.
\textsuperscript{55} Compare Hawes' discussion on pp. 12, 15-14, and "Development," 92-93. See Schutz, \textit{CP II}, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{PSW}, p. 88.
\textsuperscript{57} The term "objective" here and in the rest of this section ought not be construed in Schutz's phenomenological sense, but rather in the more common usage of the Anglo-American philosophical tradition.
\textsuperscript{58} See \textit{PSW}, pp. 92-93. Hawes' misunderstanding of Schutz's view of the relation of the two types of motive to action is perpetuated in Hawes and Smith, p. 424.
\textsuperscript{60} The use of ideal types in accomplishing this is discussed in \textit{ibid.}, pp. 61-62.
subjective meaning-context as an objective state of affairs seems to derive from Brodbeck's approach to "psychological meaning" in which that meaning is reduced to bodily states.61 This derivation is evidenced by Hawes' statement that "behaviors' and 'meanings' are coextensive" (p. 12).

Thus it appears that Hawes' views are at base grounded in a logical empiricist philosophy of science and a "behavioristic" approach to human action.62 These twin commitments define the perspective from which Hawes attempts to interpret Schutz. Hawes fails to recognize that the point of view Schutz exemplifies is premised on a denial of those two presuppositions. It is just because of that denial that Schutz's work cannot serve as a foundation for Hawes' approach to communication. And it is just because of the failure to recognize the denial that Hawes' theory cannot be taken to be a genuine synthesis of the divergent points of view that Schutz and Brodbeck represent.

IV

Hawes attempts to construct a substantive theory of communication and correlative methodological recommendations, both of which are presumably derived from his conceptual foundations. A careful analysis of Hawes' views, however, reveals a lack of conceptual coherence.63

If, as Hawes claims, "behaviors' and 'meanings' are coextensive" (p. 12), then presumably when one has identified a behavior one has also identified its meaning; and when one has identified two behaviors as being "the same," one can conclude that the "meanings" are "the same." But this is contradicted by Hawes' claim that "the same behavior—manifested at different times, in relation to other behaviors, and in different spatial or social contexts—has potentially different referential, signifying, intentional, and psychological meanings" (p. 20). Now if "the same behavior" may have different "meanings," then "behaviors" and "meanings" are not coextensive.

This contradiction might be reconciled in three ways.65 First, it might be claimed that in the statement that "behaviors" and "meanings" are coextensive, the term "meanings" refers to something other than "referential, signifying, intentional, and psychological" mean-

61 See Brodbeck, p. 65.

63 The conceptual difficulties are so extensive as to obviate the possibility of systematically unraveling all of the confusion. Accordingly, we will be concerned with only some of the more salient inconsistencies. We think that a somewhat clearer presentation of views that are apparently close to Hawes' can be found in Albert E. Scheflen, "Behavioral Programs in Human Communication," in General Systems Theory and Psychiatry, ed. William Gray, Frederick J. Duhl, and Nicholas D. Rizzo (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 209-228. Hawes' program is not entirely consistent with Scheflen's, but there are several similarities.

64 As another bit of evidence regarding the disparity of Hawes' views and those of Schutz, it should be noted that Schutz has explicitly repudiated this notion: "the behavioristic interpretation of communication ... goes wrong by identifying the vehicle of communication, namely the working act, with the communicated meaning itself" (CP I, p. 218).

65 In what follows we shall argue that each of the three approaches involves further difficulties and contradictions. It should be noted that some of the difficulties we infer would be involved are, in fact, problems that beset Hawes' original presentation (and thus not simply derivative from either the initial contradiction or the possible reconciliatory approaches that we discuss).
ings. There is no evidence that this is Hawes' view, and moreover it is unclear what this additional sense of "meaning" could be for Hawes.66

The second way in which the contradiction might be reconciled is by claiming that "behaviors" and "meanings" are coextensive, but that when one describes behavior one gives an account of the relevant "environmental circumstances"67 (which include, for instance, the relation of the behavior in question to other behaviors, and the spatial and social contexts); thus when the environmental circumstances change, so do both the description of the behavior and (since "behaviors" and "meanings" are coextensive) its "meaning." This would be in keeping with Hawes' claim that "discrete bits and pieces of behavior cannot be extracted from the stream of interconnected acts, of interact; s" and studied independently" (p. 14). Such an approach leads, however, to two difficulties. First, it implies that when two behaviors are manifested in different spatial or social contexts or in relation to different behaviors, the two behaviors cannot possibly be "the same," since for two behaviors to be the same they must be manifested in identical spatial and social contexts and in identical relations to the same type of other behaviors. This implication, of course, means that any talk of "the same behavior . . . in different spatial or social contexts" is internally inconsistent. The second difficulty with adopting this approach is that Hawes' coding-system methodology is rendered conceptually impossible to utilize. An investigator could not code a given behavior as an instance of a particular category (i.e., could not describe the behavior in question) without knowing the relation of that behavior to other behaviors (since a description of the behavior in question necessarily involves, on this approach, an account of that relation). But those other behaviors could not be coded (described) without knowing their relations; and since those other behaviors are related to the behavior in question (the "interact" notion), those other behaviors cannot be described without already having described that initial behavior—a methodological tangle in which one has nowhere to begin coding behaviors. This discussion should also make it clear that Hawes' advocacy of a coding-system methodology is at odds with his claim that "bits and pieces cannot be extracted from the stream and studied independently" (p. 14). By coding a given behavior as an instance of a category, one has extracted that behavior from the stream.

The third way of reconciling the contradiction would involve a reinterpretation of the claim that "behaviors" and "meanings" are coextensive as instead a claim that "patterns of behavior" and "meanings" are coextensive. There is some evidence that this is Hawes' view, for he argues that "by focusing on patterns of behavior rather than individual behaviors the social scientist is studying behaviors and meanings simultaneously" (p. 12) and he claims that "the meaning of behavior lies in the patterns of communication . . . " (p. 20; see also Hawes' conception of symbols, p. 15).

Presumably, then, when one has discerned the pattern of overt behavior, one has discerned the "meaning." And yet Hawes calls for "the identification of meaning correlates of the patterns of communication" (p. 21).68 Correlating

66 Not incidentally, it is rather incongruous that while Brodbeck is careful to distinguish four senses of the term "meaning," Hawes nonetheless continues to use the term in an undifferentiated fashion.
67 Brodbeck, p. 73.
68 Hawes also expresses his belief that research should center on "ascertaining the mean-
"meanings" with "patterns of manifest behavior" is unnecessary, of course, if the patterning per se is "where the meaning lies" or is "what gives the manifest behaviors meaning." If "by focusing on patterns of behavior" we are "studying behaviors and meanings simultaneously" (p. 12), then we do not need "methodological approaches for ascertaining the meanings of behavioral patterns" (p. 21), for once we have the "pattern" we ipso facto also have the "meaning." Conversely, of course, if one grants that the methodological recommendations are justified, then one denies that "patterns" and "meanings" are coextensive.

These problems seem to be essentially conceptual, centering on the terms "behavior," "pattern," and "meaning." One might hope that Hawes' definition of communication would clarify his usage of these terms. Communication is defined as "patterned space-time behavior with a symbolic referent" (p. 13). Two aspects of this definition are problematic. First, it is not clear why the term "behavior" is modified by "space-time." This qualification can be construed in three ways. It might mean that all behavior, and thus communication behavior, occurs in space and time; this is unobjectionable but uninformative and (given Hawes' physicalism) redundant. It might simply serve to emphasize that communication occurs in a context (see p. 20); but this too seems necessarily true. Or it may indicate a distinction between "manifest behavior" (extended in space and time) and "cognitive behavior" (p. 20; not extended); but this apparently Cartesian dualism is difficult to reconcile with Hawes' physicalist foundations.

The second problematic aspect of the definition is the phrase "symbolic referent." Apart from its inclusion in the definition of communication, the phrase is mentioned only when Hawes writes that he hopes his model will encourage "communication research which not only identifies patterns but also specifies the symbolic referents of communication behavior..." (p. 21). It would seem that "symbolic referents" is to be read as "meanings," since Hawes earlier had deplored the fact that while "there is a sizable literature concerned with communication as interaction," "relatively little emphasis has been placed on the identification of meaning correlates of the patterns of communication discovered in this interaction research" (p. 21). If this interpretation is valid, then communication, for Hawes, is patterned behaviors with meaning.

Such a view, of course, is at odds with Schutz's point (cited in section II) that to speak of "attaching" meaning to actions or "inserting" meaning into behavior is misleading. But beyond this, the relation of Hawes' definition of communication and his conception of a "symbol" is curious. For Hawes, "verbal and nonverbal behaviors are transformed into verbal and nonverbal symbols when the behaviors are ordered or patterned. It is their patterning that gives them 'meaning'" (p. 15). If behaviors, when patterned, become symbols, then "patterned behaviors with symbolic referents" is equivalent to "symbols with symbolic referents." And if "symbolic referents" is equivalent to "meaning," then "symbols with symbolic referents" is equivalent to "symbols with meaning." And if symbols are definitionally meaningful, then "symbols with meaning" is equivalent to "symbols." Hence Hawes' definition apparently means simply that "communication involves symbols," and thus is unenlightening with respect to the conceptual confusion at hand.
V

In this section we argue that Hawes' failure to recognize behaviorism's philosophical presuppositions led to the conceptual difficulties adumbrated in section IV.

This can perhaps be most clearly seen by considering Hawes' treatment of the notion of "pattern." Hawes seems to construe "pattern" in two fundamentally different ways. Sometimes patterns are reified as real existing patterns in the world, which the scientific investigator can discover without reference to the perspectives of the actors. On the other hand, patterns are sometimes treated as having no ontological status independent of the interpretive procedures of the interactants; on this view, "patterns" are imposed by the actor and serve to guide his actions, as well as make sense of (interpret) the actions of others. The first sense of "pattern" is that most closely approximating Brodbeck's construal of "pattern;" the second is in line with Schutz's approach. These two approaches to the concept of "pattern" are quite inconsistent with each other; and the second ("interpretive") approach is inconsistent with the two presuppositions of behaviorism. Hawes thus fails to (a) distinguish the two senses of "pattern," and employ one consistently, and (b) recognize that physicalism and logical empiricism are not compatible with the interpretive approach.

This discussion of "pattern" is illustrative of the central difficulties of Hawes' program. Hawes failed to see that Brodbeck and Schutz hold conflicting views of the nature of human action, that they employ different senses of "pattern," that they have differing conceptions of the social scientific enterprise, and so on—and thus he unjustifiably attempted to employ both approaches. And in that attempt, Hawes was led—understandably—into a good deal of conceptual confusion.

All of this could have been avoided if Hawes had been sufficiently well acquainted with the philosophical issues underlying the social scientific enterprise, and with the positions taken on these issues by the authors he drew on. What seems clear is that if communication theorists are to make their own presuppositions clear, if they are to genuinely understand alternative available conceptions of human interaction, and if they are to construct conceptually grounded methodologies, then it is just these philosophical concerns that must be explicitly acknowledged.

Now one can find passages in Hawes' article that seem to belie our interpretation of him as a physicalist and logical empiricist; David Smith, for example, finds certain aspects of Hawes' methodology to be "non-behavioristic." But if one examines Hawes' concrete research, it becomes all too clear that, despite his terminology, Hawes only pays lip-service to the interpretive view. In a more recent article, for example, Hawes suggests that Markov analysis "offers a unique insight into the patterns which constitute the process of a communication system. The Markov statistics and graphs present a picture of the ways the communication system behaves over time." The difference between this sort of view and that of the interpretive stance is cogently captured by Donald

69 It is this sense of "pattern" that Schefflen's work is based on.
70 For an example of this approach, see H. P. Dreyfzel, ed., Recent Sociology No. 2: Patterns of Communicative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1970), esp. the editor's introduction, p. xv.
72 Smith, p. 180.
W. Ball as the difference between “the abstract, *deus ex machina*-like concept of social system” and the view that emphasizes “social actors, not as system components, but as persons making choices, giving meaning to situations, converting ‘mere behavior’ into conduct.”

It is just the failure to recognize the radical departure of the interpretive view from the traditional conception of the social scientific enterprise which led Hawes into the methodological and conceptual confusions discussed above. This problem plagues many attempts to grasp the significance of the interpretive approach. David Smith, for example, argues for the rejection of behavioristic methodology; his discussion of alternatives includes mention of the ethnomethodologists (who have attempted to actualize Schutz’s interpretive stance) and of Hawes. Smith fails to make clear, however, the divergence of Hawes and the ethnomethodologists. One must be careful not to take a superficial similarity in method to be a fundamental agreement on the basic principles undergirding the social scientific endeavor; Hawes’ methods are “non-behavioristic” in the sense that behaviorists may not typically employ them, but Hawes’ approach remains fundamentally behavioristic in that it continues to rest on behaviorism’s presuppositions (which, for example, the ethnomethodologists deny). Similarly, Dennis Smith attempts to treat R. D. Laing’s interpretive view of the interactants’ perspectives within a cybernetic-systems framework. These and similar abortive attempts to come to grips with the interpretive view point up, we think, the central importance of philosophical issues within communication theory; we will fail to do justice to our subject matter and to the views of our fellow theorists if we fail to be well acquainted with the philosophical concerns that underlie social science.


