

A Guilt-Based Explanation of the Door-in-the-Face Influence Strategy

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A new explanation is proposed for the accumulated research findings concerning the door-in-the-face (DITF) influence strategy. The explanation treats successful DITF implementations as based on guilt: Refusal of the first request creates guilt, and compliance with the second request reduces guilt. In addition to explaining the known effects of DITF moderator variables, the explanation is consistent with current theoretical and empirical understandings of the nature of guilt and with extant research findings concerning guilt-based social influence. This explanation also suggests a significant role for a new moderator, the identity of the beneficiary of the request. A reanalysis of previous meta-analytic findings confirms the importance of that moderator.

This article proposes a new explanation for the effects of the door-in-the-face (DITF) influence strategy. It initially describes the DITF strategy and then summarizes the observed effects of several moderating variables that have been explored as possible influences on the size of DITF effects. The prevailing explanation of DITF effects, the reciprocal concessions explanation, is shown to fail to account satisfactorily for the observed effects of the possible moderators. A new explanation is then proposed, one that treats successful DITF implementations as based on the arousal and reduction of guilt. A number of different lines of supporting evidence are reviewed, and some complexities and caveats attached to the proposed explanation are considered. A concluding discussion frames the explanation within larger developments in the study of social influence.

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THE DITF STRATEGY AND ITS EFFECTS

The DITF Influence Strategy

The DITF strategy involves making two successive requests of the receiver (the influence target). The first request is a relatively large (demanding) one, which the receiver rejects; then a second, smaller request (which is the target request, the one of interest to the influencing agent) is made.

The question is whether the receiver's having declined the initial request (having metaphorically closed the door in the requester's face) will make the receiver more likely to agree to the subsequent request. Evidence of a DITF effect thus consists of finding that compliance with the target request is significantly higher in the DITF condition than in a condition in which receivers hear only the target request.

A classic illustration of DITF effects is provided in a study by Cialdini et al. (1975, Experiment 1), in which people were approached on a campus sidewalk by another student purportedly representing the "County Youth Counseling Program." In the DITF condition, a large initial request was made—that the receiver spend 2 hours a week, for a minimum of 2 years, working as an unpaid volunteer counselor at the County Juvenile Detention Center. No one agreed to this request. The second (target) request was that the receiver serve as an unpaid volunteer chaperone, spending 2 hours one afternoon or evening taking a group of juveniles from the detention center to visit the zoo. When people heard only the target request, only 17% consented to serve as a chaperone. But in the DITF condition, 50% agreed to chaperone.

Observed DITF Effects and Possible Moderating Variables

A great deal of research evidence has accumulated concerning the DITF strategy, and several substantial meta-analytic reviews exist. The mean effect observed in DITF studies (where the effect of interest is the relative effectiveness of the DITF condition compared to that of a condition in which only the target request is received) is roughly equivalent to a correlation of .08, although under favorable conditions the effects are larger (see Dillard, Hunter, & Burgoon, 1984, p. 471; Fern, Monroe, & Avila, 1986, p. 150).

Meta-analytic reviews have indicated that at least three moderating variables influence the size of DITF effects. First, as the time interval between the two requests increases, the size of the DITF effect is reduced (Dillard et al., 1984; Fern et al., 1986). Second, DITF effects are larger when the same person makes both requests than when different persons make

the two requests (Fern et al., 1986). Third, DITF effects are larger when the requests come from prosocial organizations (community organizations, civic groups, and the like) as opposed to for-profit organizations (Dillard et al., 1984). There is also evidence suggesting that the size of DITF effects is not moderated by the size of the concession made (Fern et al., 1986); that is, DITF effects are not influenced by whether there is a large (as opposed to small) difference between the sizes of the two requests.

THE RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS EXPLANATION OF DITF EFFECTS

The leading candidate for explaining DITF effects is the reciprocal concessions explanation, which suggests that the sequence of requests makes the situation appear to be like a negotiation or bargaining situation (Cialdini et al., 1975). In such a circumstance, when one side makes a concession, the other side is expected to reciprocate. Thus, this explanation suggests that the smaller second request appears to represent a concession, and hence it produces a reciprocal concession from the receiver (in the form of compliance with the second request).

However, the reciprocal concessions explanation does not appear to be consistent with the accumulated research evidence. First, the observed effects for organization type seem not easily accommodated by the explanation. At a minimum, there is no apparent reason why concessions from prosocial organizations should receive greater reciprocation than concessions for profit-making organizations. In fact, the observed effect is arguably the opposite of that expected from a reciprocal concessions standpoint. The reciprocal concessions explanation emphasizes that DITF success is driven by the receiver's perception of the situation as one involving bargaining. But it is surely easier for persons to see a transaction with a commercial organization as bargaining or negotiation than for them to see transactions with prosocial organizations in such a way; profit-making organizations commonly and obviously enter into bargaining transactions (e.g., labor-management negotiations) in ways not so apparent for prosocial organizations.

Second, the reciprocal concessions explanation would lead one to expect that the size of the concession would influence DITF effects—specifically, that as the size of the concession increases, DITF effects will become stronger. A larger concession by one bargainer presumably puts more pressure on the other to make some reciprocating concession. However, as discussed above, the empirical evidence offers scant reason to suppose that concession size influences the DITF effect.

In short, the best-known DITF account is inconsistent with the observed moderator effects. Other explanations also appear to be incapable of accounting for the accumulated empirical evidence (see Dillard, 1991). Thus, despite more than 20 years of research on the DITF strategy, no very attractive explanation is in hand.

A PROPOSED EXPLANATION: DITF AS GUILT BASED

The account we wish to propose treats DITF as a species of emotional appeal. The general idea of an emotional appeal is that arousing a particular emotion may enhance social influence efforts. A familiar example is the fear appeal, which seeks to arouse fear in the hope of eliciting greater compliance.

Our explanation of DITF effects is quite simple. When the DITF strategy is successful (i.e., when target-request compliance is enhanced in the DITF condition compared to the control condition), that success comes about through a guilt arousal and reduction process, in which rejecting the first request induces guilt in the receiver, and accepting the second request reduces that guilt. When DITF effects do not obtain (i.e., when the DITF implementation fails to enhance compliance), this explanation points (initially) to two possible reasons: (a) Rejection of the initial request might not have generated sufficient guilt, or (b) acceptance of the second request would not have provided sufficient guilt reduction.

This analysis thus contains two broad hypotheses about how and why the size of DITF effects will vary. First, anything that influences the amount of guilt experienced as a result of declining the first request will, *ceteris paribus*, correspondingly influence the success of the DITF strategy; for instance, anything that increases the amount of guilt felt will presumably increase the success of the strategy. Second, anything that influences the guilt-reducing properties of compliance with the second request will, *ceteris paribus*, influence the success of the strategy; so, for example, anything that minimizes the guilt-reducing aspect of second-request compliance will presumably decrease DITF effects.

EVIDENCE SUPPORTING A GUILT-BASED EXPLANATION

Guilt Arousal and the Moderating Factors

One requirement for a satisfactory explanation of DITF effects is that the explanation be consistent with the observed pattern of effects associ-

ated with variables that might moderate DITF effects. The guilt-based account explains the observed effects of possible moderator variables very well.

Time interval effects. Guilt, like any emotion, is likely to dissipate over time. Thus, as time passes, the guilt experienced from the rejection of the first request will diminish. Hence, the guilt-based explanation predicts that the time interval between the two requests will influence the size of the DITF effect, such that over time the DITF effect diminishes; as discussed above, this is the observed pattern of empirical results.

Identical requester effects. When guilt is aroused, individuals will presumably be motivated to reduce their guilt somehow. There may be many alternative routes to guilt reduction available to a person, but these different routes will not necessarily be equally effective in reducing guilt. Consider, as an example, the stereotypical adulterous husband who might reduce his guilt by making a charitable donation. But instead he sends flowers to his wife (the presumably injured party) because offering such reparations to the injured party provides greater guilt reduction.

Similarly, when the same person makes both requests in the DITF sequence, the receiver has an opportunity to satisfy the presumably injured party in a way that is not afforded under conditions in which the second request comes from a different person. Thus, the guilt-based explanation predicts that DITF effects will be stronger when the two requests come from the same person than when the two requests come from different people, and, as discussed above, this pattern of effects obtains in the research literature.

Organization-type effects. The guilt-based explanation offers two sources for the larger DITF effects observed with requests from prosocial organizations (as compared to effects with requests from for-profit organizations). First, rejecting an initial request from a prosocial organization is likely to create more guilt than rejecting a request from a for-profit organization. Second, accepting the subsequent request will presumably offer greater guilt reduction if the request one agrees to fulfill comes from a prosocial organization as compared to a for-profit organization.

Concession-size effects. As previously discussed, the size of the concession apparently does not influence the size of DITF effects. It was theoretically important for researchers and reviewers to consider this possible moderator because the reciprocal concessions explanation appears to predict that the size of the concession should moderate DITF effects. But

a guilt-based analysis makes no such prediction and is wholly consistent with the lack of observed effects for this variable.

Beneficiary Identity as a Moderating Factor

The proposed guilt-based explanation suggests a new possible source of variation in DITF effects, based on a distinction between the requester (the person making the request) and the beneficiary (the person or organization that benefits from the request being granted). For example, in the classic study by Cialdini et al. (1975, Experiment 1), the requester was a college student, but the beneficiary would be the juveniles at the County Juvenile Detention Center.

A guilt-based analysis suggests that variations in the identity of the beneficiary will influence the guilt-reducing properties of second-request compliance. In a sense, when the initial request is refused, there are potentially two injured parties—the person who made the request and the potential beneficiary of the request. Being able to comply with a second request from the same requester for the same beneficiary presumably would provide greater guilt reduction than would (to take the opposite extreme) complying with a smaller request from a different requester for a different beneficiary. Broadly speaking, then, the guilt-based explanation leads one to expect that DITF effects should be comparatively larger when both the requester and the beneficiary are held constant across the two requests and should be smaller when this condition does not obtain—especially if both the requester and the beneficiary change from the first to the second request.

To assess this prediction, the DITF effect sizes reviewed in the meta-analysis by Dillard et al. (1984) were reanalyzed.¹ These effect sizes were expressed as correlations, with positive correlations indicating greater compliance in the DITF condition than in the control condition.

Dillard et al. (1984) analyzed 24 such correlations. Of these, 17 came from studies in which the same requester and beneficiary appeared in both requests (Cann, Sherman, & Elkes, 1975, Study 1 and Study 2; Cialdini & Ascani, 1976; Cialdini et al., 1975, Study 1 and Study 3; Even-Chen, Yinon, & Bizman, 1978, Study 1 and Study 2; Goldman & Creason, 1981; Miller, 1974; Miller, Seligman, Clark, & Bush, 1976; Mowen & Cialdini, 1980, Study 1 and Study 2; Reingen, 1978; Reingen & Kernan, 1979; Schwartzwald, Raz, & Zvibel, 1979; Shamab & Isonio, 1980; Shamab & O'Neill, 1979). The mean weighted correlation (based on *z*-transformed *r*s, following procedures described by Hedges & Olkin, 1985, pp. 230-231) across these 17 cases was .10 (the 95% confidence interval is .06, .15).

In the remaining seven studies, the second request had a different requester, a different beneficiary, or both a different requester and a

different beneficiary than did the first request (Cialdini et al., 1975, Study 2; Crano & Sivacek, 1982; Foss & Dempsey, 1979, Study 2 and Study 3; Reingen & Kernan, 1977; Snyder & Cunningham, 1975; Tybout, 1978). The mean correlation across these seven cases was $-.05$ (the 95% confidence interval is $-.13, .03$).

The observed direction of difference between these means is entirely consistent with a guilt-based explanation: When the identity of the requester and beneficiary varies in the second request, DITF effects are correspondingly reduced. Indeed, despite the small number of effect sizes, these mean correlations are significantly different ($p < .05$).

The number of studies in which the second request varies the identity of the requester or beneficiary is small, which can make further subsetting of such studies problematic. But it is useful to examine one such breakdown in which studies varying the identity of both the requester and the beneficiary are distinguished from studies in which only one of these is varied. The guilt-based analysis would lead one to expect that DITF effects would be particularly weakened when both the requester and the beneficiary change from the first request to the second.

When examined with an eye to this more specific variation in the identity of the requester and beneficiary, the seven studies yielded eight effect sizes.² Of these eight effect sizes, four involved either a different requester or a different beneficiary, but not both (Cialdini et al., 1975, Study 2, rejection-moderation condition; Foss & Dempsey, 1979, Study 2 and Study 3; Tybout, 1978). Across these four effect sizes, the mean correlation was $.02$ (the 95% confidence interval is $-.09, .12$).

In four cases, both the requester and the beneficiary were different in the second request as compared to the first (Cialdini et al., 1975, Study 2, two-requester control condition; Crano & Sivacek, 1982; Reingen & Kernan, 1977; Snyder & Cunningham, 1975). The mean correlation across these four cases was $-.15$ (the 95% confidence interval is $-.27, -.02$).

Thus, the mean effect size obtained when the second request has both a different requester and a different beneficiary is significantly ($p < .05$) smaller than that obtained when both the requester and the beneficiary are identical across the requests, and it is also marginally ($p < .20$) smaller than that obtained when there is either a different requester or a different beneficiary (but not both) in the second request. In fact, when the identities of both the requester and the beneficiary change, the observed mean effect size is dependably ($p < .05$) negative.

DITF and Research on Guilt

If the proposed explanation is sound, it should be consistent not only with what is known about DITF effects but also with relevant research

concerning guilt. Research on guilt is too extensive to review thoroughly here (see Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Tangney, 1995), but three facets of this work merit comment.

Guilt induction and guilt feelings. There have been a number of recent general discussions of the nature of various emotions (including guilt), with corresponding attention to the conditions inducing and the feelings associated with specific emotions (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Miceli, 1992; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Vangelisti, Daly, & Rudnick, 1991). Guilt is commonly seen as linked to "suffering that oneself has caused" (Baumeister et al., 1994, p. 246). The reactions distinctively associated with feelings of guilt include "thinking that you were in the wrong," "thinking that you shouldn't have done what you did," "feeling like undoing what you have done," and "wanting to make up for what you've done wrong" (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994, p. 215). Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski (1994), in focusing on shame and guilt, found that persons "tended to undo shame situations by altering qualities of the self and to undo guilt situations by altering actions" (p. 585).

Such findings are consistent with our guilt-based analysis of DITF effects. For example, refusing to volunteer to help troubled children implicitly inflicts harm on them and might easily lead one to feel that "I was wrong to do that," "I shouldn't have done that," and "I'd like to undo that somehow." That is, refusal of the initial DITF request appears to be capable of arousing precisely the sorts of feelings distinctively associated with guilt. And the second request in the DITF sequence may offer the prospect of altering one's actions, undoing the harm, and making up for what one has done.

Guilt and prosocial requests. A number of investigations have explored the relationship between guilt and compliance with prosocial requests. A common arrangement in such studies is to induce guilt in participants and subsequently to make a prosocial request of them. Across a variety of guilt induction procedures and prosocial requests, guilt has been found to significantly enhance request compliance (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Darlington & Macker, 1966; Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; Konoske, Staple, & Graf, 1979; Regan, Williams, & Sparling, 1972; Regan, 1971; Wallace & Sadalla, 1966). Consenting to these prosocial requests presumably served to reduce participants' feelings of guilt (for a more detailed discussion of this literature, see Baumeister et al., 1994, pp. 249-251).

In the context of explaining DITF effects, these findings confirm the role that request compliance can play in guilt reduction. The guilt-based DITF account requires that second-request compliance serve to reduce guilt,

and this evidence suggests that request compliance is indeed a possible guilt reduction mechanism.

Guilt appeals in persuasive messages. A small body of work concerns the use of guilt appeals in persuasive messages. Guilt appeals can be seen as conceptually parallel to fear appeals. Fear appeals conventionally involve (a) the arousal of fear or anxiety in the message receiver, followed by (b) the presentation of a recommended course of action that can reduce the fear (see, e.g., Boster & Mongeau, 1984). Guilt appeals similarly involve (a) the arousal of guilt, followed by (b) the presentation of a recommended course of action that can reduce the guilt.

Relatively few studies of guilt appeals have been conducted, making confident generalization difficult. Broadly speaking, however, it appears that (a) it is possible for message variations to induce varying levels of guilt in message receivers (e.g., Bozinoff & Ghingold, 1983; Pinto & Priest, 1991; Ruth & Faber, 1988; Yinson, Bizman, Cohen, & Segev, 1976); (b) akin to findings concerning fear appeals (Boster & Mongeau, 1984), the intensity of message content is not perfectly correlated with the amount of guilt induced, so that the most intense message contents do not necessarily arouse the greatest amount of guilt (Coulter & Pinto, 1995; Pinto & Priest, 1991); and (c) greater induced guilt can make for greater persuasiveness, although effects may be small and the relationship may be curvilinear such that compliance is greatest at moderate levels of guilt (Bozinoff & Ghingold, 1983; Ghingold & Bozinoff, 1981; Ruth & Faber, 1988; Yinson et al., 1976).

For present purposes, what is striking is the parallel between the general conceptual structure of guilt appeals and the structure of the DITF strategy as understood from a guilt-based perspective. Both involve an initial arousal of guilt (in guilt appeals, by such means as the communicator reminding the receiver of some guilt-inducing shortcoming; in DITF, by the receiver declining the initial request), followed by the presentation of a course of action that might diminish that guilt (the recommended action in guilt appeals, the second request in the DITF strategy).

COMPLEXITIES AND CAVEATS

The Relationship of Request Refusal and Guilt Arousal

As noted earlier, one general hypothesis issuing from our guilt-based analysis is that anything that influences the amount of guilt experienced as a result of declining the first request will, *ceteris paribus*, correspondingly influence the success of the DITF strategy. But this hypothesis

requires some clarification and qualification because the relationship between request refusal and guilt arousal is complex.

First, our analysis does not claim or assume that rejection of a request inevitably creates guilt. Sometimes the refusal of a request will induce guilt; other times it will not. Indeed, this is a central feature of our explanation of DITF failures (e.g., the lower DITF success rates associated with nonprosocial requests).

Second, our explanation is committed to no specific prediction concerning the relationship between the size of the initial request and the amount of guilt experienced from rejecting that initial request. So, for example, our explanation does not claim that larger initial requests will, when rejected, necessarily create greater guilt. The relationship between request size and the amount of guilt experienced might be nonlinear or even negatively linear (i.e., with greater guilt experienced by declining more modest requests). All that is claimed by the current explanation is that whatever influences the amount of guilt experienced from first-request rejection will (subject to various caveats) correspondingly influence the success of the DITF strategy.

In fact, given extant research findings concerning guilt-based persuasive appeals, we would expect the relationship between request size and guilt induction to be quite complicated. As noted previously, the intensity of guilt appeal persuasive message content is not perfectly correlated with aroused guilt; messages with intense contents can arouse less guilt than messages with more moderated appeals (Coulter & Pinto, 1995; Pinto & Priest, 1991). Thus, in no case should any simple relation be anticipated between initial request size and aroused guilt.³

Third, our view does not assume that refusals of nonprosocial requests are incapable of generating guilt or that refusals of prosocial requests always create guilt. Thus, despite the observed general moderating effect of organization type, our analysis does not predict that the DITF strategy will inevitably be more successful with prosocial requests than with commercial requests. Instead, our analysis suggests that commercial requesters, for example, will find the DITF strategy effective only when the circumstance is such that declining the initial request might generate guilt that could be assuaged by acceptance of the second request. For instance, overdue-debt collectors might find the DITF strategy useful; the rejection of an initial large request (say, to repay in full immediately) might induce sufficient guilt that a subsequent smaller request (for partial payment) would meet with greater success. To put the point generally, because (ex hypothesi) the observed moderator variables influence DITF outcomes through effects on guilt induction and reduction, our analysis suggests that the observed moderator effects are unlikely to represent necessary (or sufficient) conditions for DITF success.

Arousal of Other Emotions

Recasting DITF phenomena in a framework of guilt arousal and reduction allows us to understand other effects that such emotional arousal might have on DITF processes. Specifically, when guilt is aroused by rejecting an initial request, there may be other emotions aroused as well—and these might influence compliance with the second request. In particular, rejection of an initial request might arouse (independent of any guilt) anger, annoyance, or similar negative emotions. In the present context, this possibility is noteworthy for two reasons.

First, previous research suggests that guilt-based social influence techniques naturally hazard negative reactions of this sort. Baumeister et al. (1995, Study 2) found that targets of guilt manipulation techniques often reported feelings of resentment about such manipulation. Guilt-based persuasive appeals have similarly been found to be capable of arousing emotions such as anger, which can undermine the message's persuasiveness (Coulter & Pinto, 1995; Englis, 1990; Pinto & Priest, 1991).

Second, extremely large initial DITF requests appear to be capable of undermining the technique's effectiveness, although only speculative explanations have thus far been advanced for this effect (Even-Chen et al., 1978; Schwarzwald et al., 1979; Wang, Brownstein, & Katzev, 1989). Thus, the findings that guilt manipulation can generate not only guilt but also resentment or anger are particularly suggestive because they point to a possible explanation of why extremely large initial requests might undermine DITF effects (namely, that, independent of the amount of guilt generated, an unreasonably large request might also generate emotions that predispose a person to be less receptive to the target request).

In any event, the importance of considering emotions other than guilt should be plain. Other studies of emotion-based social influence processes have found that manipulations aimed at influencing one emotion can also affect others, with correspondingly important consequences for the phenomena under investigation (Dillard, Plotnick, Godbold, Freimuth, & Edgar, 1996; Stout & Sego, 1994); explorations of the role of guilt in DITF processes should be sensitive to the possibility of similar effects.

The Interplay of Guilt Arousal and Guilt Reduction

We earlier articulated two general hypotheses about how DITF effects can be influenced: (a) Anything that influences the amount of guilt experienced as a result of declining the first request will, *ceteris paribus*, correspondingly influence the success of the DITF strategy; (b) anything that influences the guilt-reducing properties of compliance with the second request will, *ceteris paribus*, influence the success of the strategy.

However, these two hypotheses are not entirely independent. If refusal of the first request does not create sufficient guilt, then the guilt-reducing properties of second-request compliance are irrelevant. Similarly, if the second request offers no prospect of guilt reduction, then the guilt-inducing properties of first-request refusal are irrelevant.

This has important implications for experimental tests. A factor that influences the guilt-reducing properties of the target request might fail to influence observed DITF effects if refusal of the initial request did not induce sufficient guilt; a factor that affects the degree of guilt experienced from first-request rejection may fail to influence DITF success if the target request lacks the appropriate guilt-reducing characteristics. Thus, primary research designs aimed at investigating the role of guilt-based processes in DITF implementations will need to attend jointly to the guilt-inducing character of first-request refusal and the guilt-reducing prospects of second-request compliance.

IMPLICATIONS

Design of Future Research

With respect to future research, it might initially be borne in mind that given the relatively large number of extant DITF studies, no single additional experiment can be expected to, by itself, either add significantly to the fund of knowledge about DITF effects or provide a crucial test of the guilt-based (or any other) explanation. But the present explanation points to two broad lines of development in future research on DITF.

First, guilt assessments might usefully be included in primary research designs. Potential difficulties in assessing guilt should not be overlooked (see Kugler & Jones, 1992), but it is plainly appropriate that DITF experiments include direct assessments of guilt (or any other proposed mediating state; see Abrahams & Bell, 1994; Dillard, 1991).

Second, the guilt-based explanation provides a basis for identifying possible moderator variables; broadly, a moderator variable might operate either as a factor influencing the guilt induction properties of first-request rejection or as a factor influencing the guilt reduction properties of second-request compliance.

The amount of guilt induced by first-request rejection might be influenced by various factors. For instance, some persons are relatively more guilt prone than others (Baumeister et al., 1994, pp. 254-256; Niedenthal et al., 1994), suggesting corresponding individual differences in the likelihood of susceptibility to DITF-based influence. As another example, Miceli's (1992) analysis of guilt suggests that one essential ingredient for

guilt induction is that the person feels responsible for the guilt-inducing action; this might suggest that after the initial request has been declined, the requester should not say anything that offers a means of denying responsibility (as this would presumably minimize the guilt experienced).

Similarly, there may be additional factors that influence the amount of guilt reduction afforded by the second request. In this connection, it is instructive to consider how DITF success has been seen to be affected by the requester's indication that second-request compliance will be equally helpful (as opposed to less helpful) to the requester than first-request compliance would have been. Among the studies reviewed by Dillard et al. (1984), two employed an experimental manipulation of this property. In some experimental conditions of Miller et al. (1976) and Shanab and O'Neill (1979), the second request was accompanied by information indicating that second-request compliance would be equally important to the requester as first-request compliance would have been; in others, the second request was accompanied by information indicating that second-request compliance would be less valuable to the requester than first-request compliance would have been. Across these two studies, the mean effect size in the equally valuable conditions was .45 (the 95% confidence interval is .26, .62) and .09 in the less-valuable conditions (the 95% confidence interval is -.14, .30); despite the very small number of cases, these mean correlations are nearly significantly different ($p < .09$). Thus, emphasizing the value to the requester of second-request compliance (as compared with that of first-request compliance) may be a way of enhancing the guilt-reducing character of second-request compliance—and hence a means of increasing DITF effects.

The Delicacy and Complexity of DITF Effects

It should now be plain that our guilt-based account depicts DITF effects as extraordinarily delicate and complex. The effects are delicate, in that the DITF strategy requires a particular combination of circumstances for maximum effectiveness. Specifically, our view suggests the following conditions: Refusal of the first request must generate sufficient guilt (sufficient in the sense of passing whatever threshold is necessary for acting on felt guilt), refusal of the first request must not generate negative reactions sufficient to overwhelm the effects of whatever guilt is created, the initially created guilt must not dissipate before the second request is made, and acceptance of the second request must offer sufficient guilt reduction. This analysis thus implies that the DITF strategy can potentially be derailed in a great many ways: If refusal of the first request does not generate sufficient guilt (because of the nature of the request, insufficient guilt proneness of the receiver, the receiver's ability to deny respon-

sibility for the rejection, etc.) or generates powerful, negative reactions, if the initial guilt dissipates before the second request is made (because of the passage of time or because other guilt-reduction avenues are exploited, etc.), or if second-request acceptance does not offer sufficient guilt reduction (because the requester is different, the beneficiary has changed, etc.), then the DITF strategy's effectiveness will presumably be impaired.

At the same time, our account depicts DITF effects as being complex, in the sense that no particular set of moderating-variable conditions is absolutely necessary for DITF success. For example, our view predicts that, in general, prosocial request rejection will produce more guilt than nonprosocial request rejection, but this does not foreclose the possibility that a given nonprosocial request rejection might generate sufficient guilt to permit the successful use of the DITF strategy, nor does it foreclose the possibility that the use of the DITF strategy with a given prosocial request might fail. Thus, our view explicitly recognizes the possibility that DITF implementations might be successful with nonprosocial requests, or with different requesters, or with different beneficiaries, and so forth; it explicitly recognizes the possibility that DITF implementations might be unsuccessful with prosocial requests, or with identical requesters, or with identical beneficiaries, and so forth.

This complexity reflects the nature of guilt itself. Only relatively recently has guilt begun to receive much systematic research attention (see Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney, 1995), but guilt is plainly a complicated phenomenon: There is no easy formula to guarantee its production and no simple course of events transpiring on its arousal.

Indeed, from the present vantage point, we would expect DITF effects to be relatively difficult to produce and to typically be not especially powerful (given the hypothesized delicacy of the effect). Notably, this seems to be the picture suggested by extant meta-analytic reviews: DITF effects are generally small in magnitude and appear to exhibit considerable variability (Dillard et al., 1984; Fern et al., 1986). Given the complex combinations of conditions hypothesized to bear on DITF success, this is precisely the pattern of empirical effects expected by our guilt-based account.

Contextualizing the Guilt-Based Explanation

There are two ways in which the current explanation should be contextualized within recent developments in the study of social influence. First, this explanation should be seen as joining the rekindling of interest in emotional aspects of social influence (see, e.g., Cho & Stout, 1993; Dillard, 1993; Dillard & Kinney, 1994; Holbrook & Westwood, 1989; Kinder, 1994). Where the reciprocal concession explanation emphasizes underlying cog-

nitive perceptual processes (a cold-hearted assessment of a situation as involving negotiation), our analysis emphasizes the emotions aroused by the response to the first request—both guilt and other emotions, such as annoyance or anger.

Second, our explanation should be seen as a step toward integrative accounts of social influence processes. A long list of influence strategies has been accumulating in the strategy effects literature. In addition to the familiar foot-in-the-door (Freedman & Fraser, 1966) and DITF strategies, there are such strategies as the that's-not-all technique (Burger, 1986), the low-ball technique (Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, & Miller, 1978), the lure procedure (Joule, Goulloux, & Weber, 1989), and the defusing objections technique (Pardini & Katzev, 1986). But a general understanding of social influence processes will want something more than a haphazard collection of strategies. It will be important to see how different appeal types are related to one another, so that common underlying mechanisms may be identified.

In the research literature, DITF is sometimes treated as a distinctive strategy, with correspondingly distinctive explanatory mechanisms posited (e.g., Goldman, McVeigh, & Richterkesing, 1984). Our analysis, however, suggests that DITF is best seen not as a thoroughly unique influence strategy but as closely related to other, more familiar guilt-based means of social influence. In the long term, integrative explanations of this sort will be important in advancing the general understanding of social influence processes.

NOTES

1. Our report uses the correlations and sample sizes reported in Table 2 of Dillard et al. (1984, p. 469). For two studies, that table did not contain correlations: For Goldman and Creason (1981), a *t* value was supplied, corresponding to $r = .40$ (with $N = 64$); for Tybout (1978), the reported proportions and *ns* correspond to a correlation of $-.09$ ($N = 166$).
2. Study 2 in Cialdini et al. (1975) had two different DITF conditions, which were collapsed in an analysis by Dillard et al. (1984). In one condition, the second requester was the same as the first but the beneficiary was different (the rejection-moderation condition: $r = .24$, $N = 39$); in the other, both the requester and the beneficiary differed between the two requests (the two-requester control condition: $r = -.26$, $N = 38$).
3. The question of the role of initial request size (in influencing guilt or DITF effects) is related to the question of the potential role of concession size as a DITF moderator. With a given target (second) request size, variations in the size of the initial request amount to variations in concession size: As the initial request becomes larger, there is correspondingly a larger drop in request size from the first to the second request. Our belief that the relationship between initial request size and guilt arousal is complex is thus entirely consistent with the previously mentioned meta-analytic evidence indicating no simple relationship between concession size and DITF effects (Fern et al., 1986).

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