I am taken to task for not having accomplished all of this yet. Schutz never contended that an interpretive social science could be built in one fell swoop. In my earlier response, I indicated how coding categories were the product of the everyday social actors who produced the communicative behaviors subsequently coded. I then used Markov chain models to formulate second-order constructs of everyday communicative action. The model is in the process of being tested in the social science community. When that task is more satisfactorily completed, the propositions generated must be reformulated into first-order propositions to be validated in the everyday social world where they originated.

Specific points of apparent disagreement aside, however, it was never my intent to demonstrate exegetically that Schutz and Brodbeck were saying the same things. My objective was to mine the neutral analogies uncovered by juxtaposing certain of Schutz's ideas to certain of Brodbeck's ideas. Any work of a fertile mind, such as Schutz or Brodbeck, can be interpreted in several ways. Certainly, a fertile mind can be expected to change over time—as did Schutz's. O'Keefe and Grossberg, and Natanson for that matter, are entitled to informed opinions of what Schutz "really" meant in his many works. I find it more challenging to use the thinking of the most fertile minds to stimulate my own empirical and theoretical activity.

I am not suggesting that exegetical scholarship is without merit. I am suggesting that unless it is tied to theoretical and empirical scholarship, its full impact and utility cannot be realized. I suggest that Grossberg and O'Keele add to their exegetic interests some empirical and theoretical concerns and thereby assist more broadly in our collective efforts to understand and explain human communication.

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THEORETICAL CLARITY AND INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE

We hope the following brief points illuminate certain issues in our dialogue with Professor Hawes, to the end of a clearer picture of our differences.

(1) When Hawes wrote that "'behaviors' and 'meanings' are coextensive" we took him to mean that the two terms had the same logical extension (i.e., referred to the same objects); our reading followed the usual philosophical sense of the term (see OED) and dovetailed with Hawes' claim that the "patterns of communication constitute the 'because' and 'in-order-to' motives." The rejoinder makes it clear that by "coextensive" was meant something very different and quite idiosyncratic, and that whatever "constitute" meant, it did not mean "compose." Careful word choice, however, is essential to the clarity and precision the rejoinder urges.

(2) Our linkage of Brodbeck's objectivism with behaviorism is characterized as a "force-fit argument," "guilt by association" that "simply will not wash." The charge unfortunately ignores Brodbeck's explicit statement that "objectivism" is her broader term for a view
“Known as behaviorism” in psychology. A careful reading of an author's work is essential to a full and fruitful understanding of that work.

We are charged with separating Schutz’s conception of action from his prescriptions for the study thereof, but here we follow Schutz’s own procedure. His discussions of the concept of action, projected and completed acts, the two types of motive—all were conducted “while our study was as yet limited to the stream of consciousness of the solitary Ego. . . . We then turned to an analysis of the social world,” of ideal types and the methods of social science. And in avoiding the details of Schutz’s phenomenology we are one with Hawes; we all avoid the phenomenological fine-points (polythetic Acts, internal time-consciousness, the Ego-ray, prephenomenal experience) in chapter two of PSW—after which, as Hawes notes, Schutz abandons “the strictly phenomenological method.”

Hawes and we hold different views of the import of interpretive social science; his reading rests heavily on the “Concept and Theory Formation” article, an essay described by Maurice Natanson (in the Missouri Symposium on Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, ed. Joseph Bien [Columbia: Univ. of Missouri Press, forthcoming] as a singularly misleading guide to Schutz’s views. This essay seemingly supports Hawes’ construal of interpretive social science as beginning with “subjective data” and ending with “objectively valid theories.” But this construal over-


3 Ibid., p. 97.


5 Collected Papers, I, p. 40.
terpretation; instead the patterns are treated in the first sense of "pattern" noted in section V of our essay, not the second (interpretive) sense.

(5) Differences in interpretation are always difficult to resolve in print, since only short citations from an author's work can be presented. Our reading of the complete programs of Schutz and Brodbeck has then holding widely divergent stances and fundamentally opposed epistemological orientations; as indicated in our earlier essay, we do not feel the advancement of theoretical issues best served by playing free with selected concepts drawn from theorists of radically contradictory perspectives. While we are naturally inclined to think our reading exegetically preferable, it is a question readers can best decide for themselves through careful examination of the relevant works.

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A REPLY TO METAPHOR AND LINGUISTIC THEORY

I

Current directions in linguistic theory relative to the vexing problem of describing and explaining metaphor are certainly of interest to communication theorists. It is because of such significance that Paul Campbell's problematic article "Metaphor and Linguistic Theory" (hereafter cited as MLT) must be confronted.¹

The crucial conceptual issue is that MLT is not an argument. First, MLT should have acknowledged the well recognized fact that the Katz/Fodor position (hereafter cited as KF) did not include figurative language nor even claim to account for metaphor.² Second, Dwight Bolinger in "The Atomization of Meaning" (1965) responded directly to the structural faults in the KF position and convincingly argued that a semantic theory must include metaphor.³ Third, a short time later (1966) Uriel Weinreich continued the argument and thoroughly discredited the KF position. Weinreich also opened the way for significant theoretical advances in Section 3, "A New Semantic Theory," of the same article cited in MLT.⁴ Fourth, the conceptual position of MLT is 10 years out of date and would commonly be described as some variety of that infamous academic strategy—the "straw man."

Therefore, MLT presents no substantive argument. Curiously, however, the basis for an argument appears as an "appendage" to be found when one reads the specific articles referred to in MLT footnotes 11, 25, and 28. In fact, the interested reader might take the
